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understood as a characteristic 
the study of policing. At root this is because the task of 
political, a normative concerned with the use of to maintain 
a construction of social order. Self-evidently those who wield institu-
tional power to be held accountable for how it is exercised. Debates about 
policing are thus never far removed from debates about As a 
concept, however, requires academic 
concerns a social relationship in which someone is required to or 
their (non)conduct in a forum that may lead to sanction (Bovens 2005). It would 
be a grand irony should those whose core role entails rules and 
ing others to account for their normative be themselves found 
wanting for accountability (Stenning 1995). Yet accountability is a con-
tested issue. It as Bovens (2005) reminds us, a 'hurrah' word, the fundamental 
purpose of which is difficult to oppose. As a consequence it can be rhl'•tm·tf><> 
invoked to all manner of or ideological reforms. It has also 
become something of a versatile and expansive concept, which has been 
in various conceptual directions allowing it to be deployed in support of par-
ticular but often agendas (Mulgan 2000). This mutant ch<l.ra<;tet'1StiiC, 
however, reaffirms the need for academic study. Its deployment raises a series of 
ri.,,,,.,,., ... t,ou" questions concerning the selective nature of accountability arrange-
ments: who is accountable, to whom, for what, through what what 
standards will be applied, and with what effects (Mashaw 2006)? These ques-
tions are important as they beget analytical or more sociological questions con-
cerning the broader implications that arise from the pursuit of 'accountability'. 
Accountability regimes therefore - like policing systems - involve 
choices. The power to oblige others to account for their actions, decisions and 
omissions can be understood as a means of control. It is therefore crucial within 
the study of policing that we understand how accountability regimes ,,,,...,,"'"' 
the changes and continuities apparent within and between them, as well as their 
causes and effects. 
Broadly stated, it is apparent that political, legal, economic and technological 
developments have served to alter the contexts, methods and processes by which 
those involved in organised forms of policing are governed and rendered 
2 S. Lister and M Rowe 
are 
"'"""""'S those 'individuals' and 'insti-
tutions' responsible for its and between the and 
sectors, and at 'local', 'national' and 'transnational' scales 
tion. The extent and pace of need for v11~;v"'"' 
~""WM«, analysis and debate. 
In the recent period we have seen the growth of 
involvement in policing opening new fields for academic 
of nco-liberal inspired reforms of sta:te-()rg1mi:sed 
that demands and analytical 
a cause, at other times an effect of accountability Indeed, we never 
seem far from the latest scandal or crisis to hit policing, the political and media 
fallout from which almost invariably leads to concerns about perceived failures 
of accountability. This is no coincidence. It is well-documented in the political 
science literature how 'accountability' has become a container for public 
anxieties about all multitudes of sins (Mashaw 2006). Poor behaviour, wrong 
choices, ineffective performance, inefficient use of resources are com~ 
monly reduced to a lack of accountability. The risk is that reforms set in train 
may not only primarily serve a political function, but may also 
institutions in different, potentially competing directions. For instance, 
has been a key public policy arena in which the tensions of 'localism' and 'cen-
tralism' have been played out. In England and Wales, as in other Western coun~ 
tries, we have seen principles of 'community policing' advanced to enhance 
police 'responsiveness' to local publics, simultaneous to the institutionalisation 
of centrally determined performance targets intended to drive greater organisa-
tional efficiency and effectiveness. Contemporary policing institutions are 
subject to diverse and multifaceted accountability techniques, empm-
cal, conceptual and normative questions concerning the nature, effect and 
implications of the accountability relationships to which they give rise. 
This book contributes to scholarly debates by analysing emergent and exist-
ent accountability regimes of 'police' and 'policing'. It the key con-
cepts of 'policing' and 'accountability' in broad tenns. Hence, for example, its 
analytical gaze stretches beyond state-funded policing institutions, to include 
private providers of policing and plural policing networks. Emerging forms of 
constitutional and legal governance of 'high' policing are considered alongside 
internal and external procedures designed to regulate the activities of policing 
actors, such as public complaints systems, occupational licensing regimes and 
ethical codes and protocols. Equally, it engages with the concept of 'account-
ability' in a broad sense, bringing to the surface the various meanings that have 
become associated with it and demonstrating how it is invoked and interpreted in 
3 
different contexts. Whilst the core focus of the book concerns 
and it includes 
North America and Australasia. ~ .. ·-~o·-"'"" 
chatng<)S in the of the 
have been 
aims to undertake some of the necessary 
enhance the of the effective "'"''vu"uwvu• 
ing a summary of each of the contributions we contextualise some of the book's 
themes. definition many of these themes are not new in tern1s. 
While we seek to how certain features of 
pose new that innovative 
responses. 
does 
Police officers have a paradoxical with their fellow citizens. On the 
one hand, in common law liberal democratic societies, have tended to be 
regarded as 'citizens in uniform'. the British 
Robillard and McEwan (1986: 2) summarised this conceptualisation in the fol-
terms: 
The police of this have never been recognized, either by the law or 
by as a force distinct from the body of citizens. j.J""~-'1'" 
the imposition of many extraneous duties on the police by or 
administrative the remains that the policeman, in the view 
of the common law, is a person paid to perform, as a matter of 
acts which if he were so minded he might have done voluntarily .... Indeed 
a policeman possesses few powers not enjoyed by the ordinary and 
public opinion, expressed in Parliament and elsewhere, has shown 
jealousy of any attempts to give increased authority to the police. 
In the three decades since this account was written police powers and respons-
ibilities the 'extraneous duties' mentioned by Robillard and McEwan -have 
changed, but the underlying principle remains: in de jure terms, the police con-
tinue to have few legal powers unavailable to citizens and continue to be person-
ally accountable for their actions. The paradox is, of course, that in de facto 
terms, the police do have considerable powers that are unavailable to civilians. 
Police officers have far-reaching powers to detain and question citizens, 
famously characterised by former Metropolitan Police Commissioner Sir Robert 
Mark as the 'power to inconvenience' (Judge 1986: 175). Policing actors per se 
also have considerable tacit and symbolic power that frequently ensures citizens 
4 S. Lister and M Rowe 
either 
otherwise ensue or, more 
For officers this 
the frontline officer on the street to more senior leaders who 
have considerable power to articulate and define social 
vuJ.<OuJ::s. Loader and (200 l a and 2001 b) have described this as the 
'power of elite and define 
ica! and social agendas. The power of the 
"""~'""" definers' of and social 
noted across a range of domains, including urban 
unrest, use and prostitution, and is a capacity not 
citizens (Hallet al. 1978). 
Equally, the institutional power and resources of the police also constitute 
forms of power unavailable to the While any member of the 
public might have the legal power to carry out a citizen's arrest, the police are 
one of the few institutions that have the resources and capacity to make this pro-
position viable. That capacity is contained and through internal police 
management and oversight as well as external, more public-facing mechanisms. 
While most of the contributions in this collection are focused on political and 
regulatory practices it must be noted that the legal also provides a forum 
for scrutinising policing activity and an avenue of redress. As Prenzler (2009) 
has noted, a fundamental cornerstone of democratic accountability is that police 
are subject to the rule of law such that operational decisions can be tested in 
court. Hence individuals can seek judicial review of discretionary police policy 
decisions and practice can be amended as a result of legal judgement. Moreover, 
citizens are able to bring civil law claims against in circumstances where 
negligence or malpractice is alleged. Whether private law remedy actually serves 
as a mechanism of accountability is debateable as Chief Constables hold vicari-
ous liability for the (non)actions of their officers when on duty (Smith 2003). 
Individual officers can though be subject to criminal prosecution, albeit they are 
not subject to the same criminal process as citizens 2001). In practice, 
however, the ability of private citizens to bring legal action against the police 
might be curtailed. The resources, and cultural and social capital, required are 
not equally available to all and many of those who might be most gravely 
exposed to police malfeasance might be among those sections of the public least 
able to access justice (Smith 2003). Prenzler (2009) also reminds us that citizens 
must have access to information if they are to be able to scrutinise effectively 
policing institutions: reliable information, transparent decision-making and 
access to senior managers and policymakers are some of the necessary precur-
sors of democratic oversight. 
The complex and institutionally embedded nature of police power means that 
external accountability mechanisms that extend beyond legal regulations are 
required for effective oversight consistent with broader principles of liberal 
democracy. Public accountability structures, widely seen as a hallmark of 'good 
governance', ensure the governance of public policing institutions is linked 
5 
argues in his contribution to this 
cratic' it more than 
have an electoral mandate. Whilst 
a normative commitment to advance human 
notions of social As Lister and Jones argue in their 
vvrr"""" of may certain structures and processes but ulti-
mately these are a range of democratic values that instil a nonn-
ative foundation for critical assessment also Jones et al. 1996). 
Robust also functions to ,,.,.w,.,.,,a oertorrna11ce 
Jn order to be effective in combatting crime and disorder modes of 
require assistance and in a host of ways. Research 
evidence confirms the police enjoy levels of public trust and con-
fidence in circumstances where they are to act on the basis 
ural (Hough et a!. 20 10). In this context, needs to be 
and to be seen to be done, in order to deliver core of the 
mandate. Public reassurance and community on the 'com-
municative action' of policing, in which audiences actions in various 
ways (e.g. as 'legitimate' or That policing institutions are v .. ~~,..,--~ 
with and reassurance to citizens with 
subjective of and safety, and so accountability to the 
public needs to be demonstrated. In this way, mechanisms that 
unJ,HJu··~ transparency and with norms of democratic governance can 
serve to enhance confidence in policing institutions. 
As citizens are more to cooperate with for information and 
assistance if they those delivering policing to have and 
macy, then accountability has an important role in delivering core policing func-
tions of law enforcement, security and order maintenance. As Jones 
'accountable' policing is not just morally and ethically desirable, but 
instrumentally superior to 'unaccountable policing'. 
A key element of promoting effective policing in diverse communities has 
been to ensure meaningful 'community engagement' with groups that often 
might have had relations of tension and conflict with police. Although com-
munity engagement is often considered to be a direct form of account-
ability, it is perhaps better considered as a form of 'answerability', particularly 
as there is no direct sanction for perceived failings. Further, it is often 
fectly conducted on terms established by the police rather than the community, 
following an established agenda, and might not easily engage with 'diffi-
cult to hear' communities (Jones and Newburn 2001). When done 
though, police engagement with local communities can enable consultation and 
6 S. Lister and M Rowe 
crimes and work 
solutions to noted 
consultation committees set up in local areas within the Mt::trcmo 
Police in the liaison of this kind can a useful conduit to ~-'""H'"'"' 
that can diffuse tensions and enhance relations with 
as we consultation is distinct from 
not least because the former does not disturb established power 
relations 
Other more administrative forms of offer the to 
throu~m target and evaluation. Moves 
evidence-based policing seek to scientific methods to 
outcomes and the inputs and mechanisms that characterise effective interven-
tions. Communication and dissemination, for in the UK, Her 
Majesty's of Constabulary or the seek to embed 
good the public Scientific however, remains 
contested terrain in terms of the blend that can provide reliable 
data, the extent to which practice can be from one context to 
another, and the to which 'outcomes' can be appropriately identified and 
measured. While often not expressed in terms of govemance and these 
practices nonetheless feed into accountability regimes. Since the development of 
New Public Management and its extension into state-funded policing and crimi-
nal justice institutions much criticism has been made of the distorting ""''J""'"' 
that can arise from managers arbitrary targets rather than achieving more 
appropriate outcomes (McLaughlin 2007). Clearly there have been many exam-
ples of policing practice being skewed by a culture. The 
core problem, however, has stemmed from the politicisation of policing rather 
than the fundamental analysis of effective performance on the basis of profes-
sional and scientific judgements (Hope 2009; Tilley 2009). Peer profes-
sional practice and scientific evaluation offer the possibility of developing 
greater efficiency and effectiveness in the delive1y of policing. But the challenge 
of ensuring that this is done in an independent and objective manner is a 
real one. 
The effectiveness of much policing practice has remained unquestioned and 
unexamined, with little having been subject to rigorous scientific analysis. Partly 
this may be due to the lack of expenditure on research. Weisburd and Neyroud 
(2011) noted that law enforcement contrasts very poorly with other public policy 
sectors such as agriculture and medicine when it comes to investment in techno-
logical innovation and evaluation. In the UK, they argued, govemment invest-
ment in medical research amounts to £600 million per year, whereas the annual 
Home Office budget for crime research amounted to just £2 million. Further, 
these authors argued that it is the political, institutional and cultural contexts of 
policing that make the development of a new paradigm of 'police science' chal-
lenging. It might also be that the contested and ambivalent mandate of policing 
makes a scientific evidence-based model difficult. If the role and function of the 
police, for instance, cannot easily be identified then it is difficult to imagine how 
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it can be evaluated in overall terms. 
can contribute to the of 
scientific innovations 
communications and 
for better health and 
be 
""''u"'"o"' for accountability of 
delivered and the standards 
broad that are reviewed 
more specific challenges, and it is to those that the 
Inevitably, effective within institutions nn~sent~ 
enduring and complex governance challenges. The in this collection 
overlapping dimensions of the challenges faced. These are considered in 
terms of trying to deal effectively with public by Pren-
zler and ensuring that policing which exists the nation 
whether transnationally (see chapter by and Sheptycki) or in the 
sector (see White's chapter), or the broader of effective gov-
emance (see Reiner's chapter, and Lister and Jones's This broad cata-
of challenges- and this book does not claim to examine all -can 
be considered in terms of those intrinsic to policing functions and those that are 
extemal and relate instead to the broader operational environment. In the former 
category the paragraphs below consider challenges to that relate 
to police operational independence (see Raine's chapter), the of 
police discretion and police operational subculture (Young's chapter), and expo-
sure to 'invitational' opportunities for corruption or malpractice (see Rowe et 
al. 's chapter). External challenges relate to debates about the declining cmoac:ltv 
of the state to provide for in the light of market provisions 
services, the political context of policing and public services, and advances in 
communication technology (see the chapter by Davids and Boyce) that transform 
the collection, transmission and analysis of data both by policing agencies, actors 
and citizens. 
The powers of the police are complex and extend beyond the 'black letter' of the 
law. To be effective, mechanisms of accountability need to be sufficiently robust 
to respond to the multifaceted exercise of police power in various forms and at 
various organisational levels. Several contributions to this collection reflect on 
problems of avoiding organisational capture such that those tasked with critical 
oversight become overly dependent on the police and therefore unable to exercise 
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m 
interference in ,...~,,r.,tim-. 
to be very blurred 1986). Well-rehearsed debates about the 
of such as rubber bullets and water cannons illustrate these tensions. 
For some the debate is an to be made 
on the basis of the efficacy of these disorder. Others 
focus on the ethical and of the state to use 'less-
than-lethal' weapons the public and the balance between the 
to life, free assembly and the to Such debates raise 
of where ought to rest for whether to If 
the argument is primarily about tactics and 
tional matter for senior if it is a !JU!Iu'"'a.' 
is more likely to be a matter of governance to be decided leaders or 
the courts. As several authors note in the that follow, the principle of 
operational independence has been tested in the recent British context since the 
creation of Police and Crime Commissioners, but these are recent manifestations 
of an inherent challenge for police accountability. 
discretion 
A fundamental cornerstone of five decades of police research is that officers 
operate with considerable autonomy and discretion. studies of the 
demonstrated that the law provided only a limited for how officers 
approached enforcement and that a host of cultural, political and sociological 
factors shaped the operational discharge of their duties (Banton 1964; Skolnick 
1966; Wilson 1968). Among the many implications of the 'discovery' of 
discretion is that officers might overturn or misapply laws that are authored 
through constitutional democratic means. The discretion available to officers 
risks the possibility that they effectively create law on their own tenns as 
attend to their routine operational duties (Neyroud and 2001). The chal-
that discretion poses for accountability are exacerbated because it is a 
particular feature of the operational activity of the lower who tend to 
operate in conditions of relative invisibility. James Wilson's (1968: 7) famous 
observation that police 'discretion increases as one moves down the hierarchy' 
has clear implications for the capacity to monitor, control and hold officers to 
account for their (non)conduct. New technologies can help to make discretionary 
decisions more visible- officers' actions can be captured on 'head earn' techno-
logy or 'Body-Worn Video' devices, for example - but there has been little 
research or debate on the effects of such developments. Administrative proced-
ures requiring officers to complete forms to record details and circumstances in 
which powers are exercised is another bureaucratic attempt to monitor how offic-
ers discharge their duties, albeit research findings have recurrently the 
efficacy of such regulatory endeavours (see Young, this collection). Even if such 
9 
unethical behaviour and cultural~.:ru•""''"K'"'" 
Not only do police officers often exercise 
stances of low often do so when 
who are "'n''"'"'"'r~ 
discretion in circum-
with 'service users' 
wish to influence that dis-
in 
more than nrAvAx>ti 
problems of malfeasance and misconduct that arise from officers' exposure to 
and 2003). historical cases of have 
arisen when officers have had close, relations with crim-
inals'. Moreover the exposure to such circumstances also shores up the internal 
solidarity, and sense of mission that are to 
culture 1978). It is those that define officers' sense that 
are the 'thin blue line' society from lawlessness. In these fea-
tures of subculture are derived from institutional and activities. 
In some ways they are desirable elements and in many seem inevit-
able responses to the routine that officers face (Chan 1997). None-
have the potential to pose for governance and 
accountability in a number of ways. Not only can they foster circumstances in 
which officer misconduct can unchecked in an insular sub-
culture, they also pose challenges to efforts to investigate of miscon-
duct and hold officers to account complaint processes. As a number of 
contributions to this collection consider, the challenge of developing effective 
mechanisms to respond to about misconduct often relates to the diffi-
culty of getting behind the 'blue curtain of silence': the strong cultural nonn for 
officers not to concerns about the problematic behaviour of their col-
leagues and not to cooperate with internal or external related 
Rowe et al. 's contribution). 
The above discussion has explored three related sets of challenges to 
accountability, each of which is presented as an internal feature of the IJv••'-'llJl)<; 
role and environment. The following sections discuss a number of "'ucmvu]o;''" 
that are related instead to the external social, economic and political context in 
which policing is delivered. 
Analysis of police governance and accountability tends to begin (and usually to 
end) with those mechanisms and regulations authored and delivered the 
nation state. An important emphasis in this collection concerns 'policing 
the state' and how this might be more effectively governed and brought into a 
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nation state 
at least, so too the need to 
on the activities of the state. 
Just as modem 
in a fom1 that we still "-"··v"'"'""'· 
"!';'"'"Ivu;:., Ulspectors "'""""""',, inves-
have been 
or have been delivered by closely 
under its of the nation state to continue to deliver these 
functions has been subject to considerable and swathes adminis-
tration literature have reviewed the extent to which liberal democratic states have 
UC•VCIIHJ~O!l a role of rather than in the of ser-
vices (Osborne and Gaebler 1992; Milward and Provan 2000). 
The growth of a state that focused on services rather than 
direct delivery has been discussed in the context of the pluralisation of policing 
(Loader 2000; Wood and 2007; Crawford 2008). the 
chapters contained here suggest that there are also significant challenges in terms 
of state systems for regulation. If the state is 'hollowed out' then the extent to 
which it is able to provide effective governance be seriously reduced 
(Milward and Provan 2000). Although research has suggested that the extent to 
which the state has lost capacity might have been overemphasised (Pollitt and 
Bouckaert 2011; Ongaro 2009), the chapters below often that regulatory 
capacity has been redistributed within state systems rather than abrogated. None-
theless there are impo1tant concerns that a period in which policing has become 
pluralised and privatised (see White's chapter, and Lister and Jones's chapter) 
and increasingly occurs within transnational networks Bowling and ,..n,~nn"­
cki's contribution) has made the need for effective accountability ever more 
pressing. At the same time, the very factors that have driven the reorganisation 
of policing threaten to render the democratic state less able, and perhaps less 
willing, to deliver that accountability. 
and 
Recent concern about unethical and corrupt behaviour within British policing 
has occurred against a background of scandal and controversy in respect of a 
number of other public agencies. Although the post-20 1 0 Coalition Government 
couched its policies in terms of transforming a police service that was the 'last 
unreformed public-sector agency' it has been clear for several decades that the 
exalted political position that the police previously enjoyed has slipped away 
(Reiner 2010; Loader and Mulcahy 2003). Indeed, it is more than two decades 
since Waddington (1993) noted that the police service had 'fallen from grace' 
among political elites. The development of concern about the efficacy of 
accountability cannot be understood solely as a mechanistic response to identi-
fied problems. As such, the particular debates analysed in this book cannot be 
understood in isolation from broader critiques of police community relations, the 
quality of leadership, effectiveness in law enforcement, trends in crime and anti-
social behaviour, and expenditure. 
n."'"'H'" a context of neo-liberal 
institutions of civic 
their own welfare and 
status of fn a 
and self-reliance established Of COllective nrf1,\11QH"\n 
trust are eroded in ways that affect a broad range of """'"+••+"'"< 
not limited to the 1) argues that a 
for of a for advocates 
and as such is to be welcomed. What remains a 
for citizens to exercise demands "n''"'~""~'" 
those with the social or to articulate and press 
their case. 
Social 
The death of Ian Tomlinson during a at the London G20 summit in 2009 
has been a case in recent controversies about policing and its account-
Following Tomlinson's a video showed an 
officer pushing Tomlinson to the ground in the moments prior to his death. The 
officer concerned was subsequently and of criminal offences 
from Tomlinson's but was subsequently sacked by the 
itan Police for gross misconduct. In many respects this incident was 
similar to others that have occurred periodically for many decades. The Tomlin-
son case, however, was distinct from earlier incidents owing to the role of social 
media and the growth of low-level forms of citizen-surveillance enabled by new 
technologies. the long-running fallout from the case, the M<ltrcmollt<m 
Police admitted that one of its officers had 'probably' been responsible for strik-
( and killing) Blair Peach during a public demonstration against fascism in 
1979. Yet whereas it took nearly four decades for the police to a 
of culpability in the death of Blair Peach, the video showing police use of 
force against Ian Tomlinson was disseminated within hours of his death 
(see Greer and McLaughlin 2012). 
It would though be simplistic to suggest that the only difference between the 
death of Ian Tomlinson and that of Blair Peach was that the former was filmed 
and disseminated on the World Wide Web in a very short time frame. But the 
two cases illustrate yet another consequence of technological change in con-
temporary society. The criminogenic potential of social media and cyberspace 
are much debated, but what is less widely noted is the capacity for 'citizen 
nalists', campaigners and ordinary members of the public to record policing 
activity in authoritative ways that have strong evidential value. Mobile apps are 
available that enable information to be recorded about encounters with those 
delivering policing, including details of the type of evidence to record and advice 
on how incidents can be reported. The potential for information and communica-
tion technology to develop the 'technologically enabled officer', equipped with 
data, maps and other resources to respond more effectively to crime and 
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~~''""'""' is set to increase in future years will 
to bear new of governance and ""''"""t"' 
inter alia that it is in ways that serve not 
but also those receiving, 
The discussion above has identified a series of for the governance 
and of policing. The faced were reviewed in terms of 
cnamgt;s within these included 
or 
encourage misconduct and inhibit internal and external PH·'""''-'Ul 
and investigation. These in a wider context of concern about 
the capacity of the state to govern and other the broader 
itics of and criminal justice, and the transformations more 
widely by communication and social media. 
The debates identified above, alongside others, are addressed through the contri-
butions contained in this collection. Offered below is a brief resume of each. 
Young explores the use of police powers to 'stop and account' citizens as a 
means for considering broader debates about the nature of accountability. The 
experience of efforts to scrutinise police use of and account powers in the 
aftermath of the Macpherson Inquiry is reviewed by The to 
enhance accountability by requiring officers to record details of stops with the 
public was significantly undermined by poor and a failure to 
extend the recording requirement to all public encounters. Problematically, the 
confused rationale for the operational of 'stop and account' undermined 
efforts to gather information that enhance accountability. In some cases 
the public were unwilling to provide information necessary for effective scrutiny 
because they had assumed it was used for purposes of intelligence-
gathering and crime control. For such reasons, Young argues, it is ineffective to 
require police officers to gather the information required to hold their own 
behaviour to account. A radical approach is proposed using citizen-recordings as 
part of a pluralistic regulatory strategy for stop and account. While this strategy 
will be challenging and requires resources and a robust system to oversee the 
investigation of material gathered by citizens, Young argues that it provides a 
creative basis for more effective democratic oversight of police work. 
Similarly innovative responses are developed in Prenzler and Porter's analysis of 
systems to deal with complaints against police. Their chapter explores ways of 
addressing police behavioural issues through enhanced management of complaints 
and disciplinary systems. Complaints can be used as a key learning tool to inform 
improved policing practices by modifying training and managerial procedures in 
response to patterns of allegations in the context of a problem-solving and com-
plaints reduction programme. Prenzler and Porter argue that accountability and fair-
ness can also be improved by supplementing simple investigative and disciplinary 
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to with more restorative responses, 
olution and mediation. The includes consideration and 
informal res-
of a number 
officer cor-
and camaraderie. In so consider how uv''""'"" 
to overcome the 'blue wall of silence' that is said to 
concerns about misconduct among their 
responses to misconduct by police have been '"''"rr.·w•n 
but that significant still need to be addressed, in a 
ised policing environment. Moreover, they argue the diverse cultural and institu-
tional settings in which to emerge continue to be overlooked 
by that continue to focus on malfeasance in individualistic 
tenns. 
Davids and Boyce begin their analysis of police misuse of confidential 
inf01mation with a discussion of the UK's Leveson which 
significant ethical concerns over police and media relations. The 
that unauthorised use of confidential files included, for infonna-
tion passed to journalists about alleged criminal activity and members of the 
(suspects, victims and others). In the course of their 
officers invariably receive or have access to a wide variety of such 
infonnation, both from official police databases and other sources. Police offic-
ers may also use their position to solicit information (unrelated to official 
in which they have a private interest. Davids and Boyce and analyse the 
'-'""-"'""' of unauthorised access and disclosure of confidential information 
police. They consider several forms of domestic or private/personal use of 
information by police officers or their associates. Problems associated with the 
disclosure of information to outside parties are also analysed (including situ-
ations where payment may be involved). In considering the types, sources and 
uses of information, Davids and Boyce examine the harms that can arise for indi-
vidual officers, the community and the legal system itself. A range of materials 
are drawn upon to infonn the analysis, including both academic and 
data sources that evidence the nature and extent of the problem. The 
closure of confidential information strikes at the heart of public confidence in, 
and the integrity of, the police. Their chapter explores these issues in the context 
of police accountability and its relationship with integrity and public trust in 
policing. 
Raine considers the implications of the introduction in 2012 of Police and 
Crime Commissioners (PCCs). It is widely accepted that PCCs- one for each 
police area of England and Wales outside London- embody the most significant 
reform of police governance for at least a generation. The new arran~(enwnts 
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contested in Parliament the process and had an 
~'"'"''"''~ start with low electoral turnout at the 
chief constables left their in response to the reform and 
apJ)Ointnnetlt of Raine examines 
the new governance structure. He 
""''"".,.""0''U'-'" within the new governance ,,.,.,,,n..,wn•·" 
between Police and Crime local 
the Home Office and other crime-related Underlying Raine's analysis 
is the of whether in practice the introduction of PCCs has enhanced 
accountability of as of the reform or created the 
conditions for more autocracy in governance too 
much power and responsibility in a single of hands. 
The recent of police governance in LH"''""'u 
in Reiner's chapter. He begins by a govern-
ment's claim of significant reform of policing is not exaggerated. The Coali-
tion's reforms of police governance are arguably the most radical since the 
development of the modern British police in the early nineteenth Reiner 
notes that although democratic policing has become a mantra to which 
service is paid around the the notion is seldom analysed. His 
seeks to help rectifY this lacuna through the application of T.H. Marshall's 
seminal analysis of citizenship. On this basis he suggests that democracy in 
general, and democratic policing in particular, has not one dimension (elections), 
but three: civil, political and socio-economic. The Coalition's reforms involve 
only one of these dimensions, the political, and in the narrowest sense. In the 
absence of strong civil and socio-economic Reiner argues critically, 
voting alone does not achieve democracy in any meaningful interpretation. 
Topping analyses how approaches to police accountability in Northern Ireland 
have played a central role in the broader development of the state in the post-
conflict period. The Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) has become gov-
erned by a host of statutory, governmental and other bodies, to the extent that it 
is widely conceived as the global 'gold standard' of police ""'''"0'""'T 
Topping identifies a number of 'mediating realities' that serve to undermine the 
mechanisms of police accountability. Centrally, Topping's argument is that 
accountability for both institutional and operational 'police action' in Northern 
Ireland is itself a 'site' of contest and that official 'accounts' of policing are but 
one version of reality. He further argues that the continuing need for robust anti-
terrorism policing sits uncomfmtably with the 'post-conflict' reimagining of the 
PSNI as a community neighbourhood police service. He suggests the promotion 
of police accountability, as part of the country's transition, has been used in par-
tisan ways and weighted toward capturing the 'positive' realities of police activ-
ity. Problematically, he argues, this means that the harsh realities of the country 
as a post-conflict society have been conveniently 'ushered' to the side. 
White examines debates about policing and accountability as they apply in 
the context of the sizeable growth of the private security industry during the last 
few decades. Accompanying this growth, both domestically and globally, has 
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White argues, institutional structures 
through which boundaries are 
Lister and Jones focus on the of the mixed economy of 
in and Wales. Their is the 
of public, private and actors are in the authorisa-
tion and provision of As a consequence, they do not restrict their ana-
to how state power, as by is made 
they consider under market networks of 
.... "''"'"'"' can be according to, and accommodated a set of 
'""''u'"'"'· In so doing, argue that 'local networks' 
state, civil society and market actors, and whose governance and 
mechanisms frequently stand outside of extant 
raise specific challenges if are to be governed not 
democratically. They proceed to consider for 
accountable governance to plural networks. 
Bowling and Sheptycki scrutinise the diffuse of global vv''"'n5 . 
This explores the architecture of global policing and provides a sense of 
the occupational subculture which has built it up around it. The shows 
how representations of global crime and disorder problems have been used to 
justifY global policing in political, legal and social terms. The credibility of this 
account is sustained the pervasiveness of certain cultural tropes that have 
their origins in the transnational subculture of policing, which are given a 
reach through the subculture of transnational policing. Bowling and 
pro•cee~a. to reflect upon how global policing is politically and legally account-
able, and try to advance thinking by considering how it ought to be. The task is 
difficult, they argue, because our models for structuring police accountability are 
ill-fitting in the global context. Policing, in the broad sense of regulation, is an 
inherent feature of any community, Bowling and Sheptycki argue, and is an 
inevitable feature of transnational global society. Ensuring that it is made 
accountable is a necessity if global policing is to promote economic activity and 
respect cultural traditions and safeguard the environment. 
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In the establishment of An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and 
Ethics of the Press in July 2011 the UK Prime Minister David Cameron stated: 
the whole country has been shocked by the revelations of the hacking 
scandal ... an episode that frankly, accusations of wide-
spread law breaking by of our press: alleged corruption by some police 
officers; and ... the failure of our political system over many, many years to 
tackle a problem that has been getting worse ... let me tum to the issue of 
ethics in the police, and in particular their with the press. Of 
course it is important that there is a good relationship between the media 
and the Police often use newspapers and other media to hunt down 
wanted criminals and to appeal for information. However, allegations have 
been made that some corrupt police officers may have taken payments from 
newspapers. And there are wider concerns that the relationship between the 
police and the press can also be too close. 
(HC Deb 13 July 2011, vol. 531, cols 311, 313) 
In conducting the Inquiry, Lord Justice Leveson was, in part, tasked with the 
responsibility of exploring the relationship between the media and police, reflect-
ing widespread concerns in the UK that this relationship was 'inappropriately 
close and if not actually corrupt, very close to it' (Jay, quoted in Leveson 2012b: 
743). Particular attention was drawn to this issue when it became known that 
police had failed to investigate properly allegations of illegal and improper 
phone hacking in 2006, 2009 and 2010. There were associated concerns about 
the unauthorised transmission of confidential information by police in the 
context of what Leveson found to be an 'arguably over-cosy relationship 
between the police and the press' (Leveson 2012b: 744). The Inquiry 'examined 
many facets of the way in which press and police interact ... looking at the over-
lapping issues of"tip offs", "taking media on operations", "off-the-record" brief-
ings, leaks, whistleblowing, gifts and hospitality, entertainment etc.' (Leveson 
2012b: 980). Leveson found that 'the best present analysis would suggest that 
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is not 
it has a corrosive effect 
ri"'''""'""rl in the Police where it does exist 
confidence in the service as a whole' 
Concems about misuse information are both 
founded. ln one sense, the matters before the Leveson 
increased for access to and use of information in an 
.:n;;""'"""n amounts of information are stored in 
the increased use of information and communication 
within the for 
Drawing on the academic literature and a number of data sources 
police, prosecutions and a range of reports "'"'uum~ 
Inquiry this chapter examines what happens when information 
into the wrong hands. Distinguishing private/personal use of 
information from disclosure, we consider types, sources and uses 
of information. an accountability we seek to harms that 
can arise for individual the community and the admin-
istration. Our analysis suggests that viewing the of misuse of 
information as part of the broader problem of conflict of interest facilitates a 
clearer on the relationship between these concems and issues of 
public trust, police integrity and accountability. 
Following an outline of the nature of the and its to the 
broader context of police accountability, we draw on empirical data and official 
from Australia and the UK in order to elaborate dimensions of the 
problem providing an outline of a variety of types and sources of information. 
We subsequently analyse the range of circumstances involved in the unofficial 
uses to which that infonnation can be put- in the context of both private or so-
called domestic use of information and disclosure (or to outside 
The range of scenarios canvassed is elucidated with original case data and a 
range of reports from Australia and the UK. We consider how this may 
be addressed as a part of the broader problem of conflict of interest and argue for 
a social accountability lens that attends to both accountability mechanisms and 
the need to develop accountability as virtue. 
Method and data sources 
The analysis in the chapter draws on real case examples drawn from several 
sources. First an original in-depth study that examined 3 77 internal 
tions case files dealing with conflict of interest over a ten-year in the Aus-
tralian state of Victoria (Davids 2005, 2008; Cases from this data set are referred 
to throughout the chapter by their case number in the original study). The data 
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set included aU vUlHfJJtawe<o where conflict 
as identified by the Victorian 
for <'"'mn>l>~int~ 
sector and similar 
a British Home Office study that drew on interviews with staff in the profes-
sional standards units (PSUs) of eight UK police forces and the National 
Crime Squad (Miller 2003);2 
reports from and similar agencies including, in Australia, 
the Victorian Office of Police Integrity3 and the New South Wales Police 
Commission, and in the UK, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of 
Constabulary; 
reports from the Leveson Inquiry in the UK (especially Leveson 2012a, 
2012b). 
the wrong hands ... 
A ne,rell!nlo'll nN!l"iiPlm 
The problem of inappropriate access and/or use of police information for 
private purposes is common to police forces across the world. It has long been 
recognised that '[i]nformation and is the lifeblood of policing', rep-
resenting 'the most valuable commodity the Police Service needs to protect' 
(HMIC 1999: 39; Office of Police Integrity 2010a; Commissioner for Law 
Enforcement Data Security 2009; KPMG 2009). Police officers necessarily 
have access to a range of official information sources in the course of their 
usual duties, including formal records such as paper and digital files and docu-
ments, and various forms of verbal and similar 'intelligence'. The increased 
focus in contemporary policing on intelligence-led methods (Miller 2003: 13) 
and on the use of information technology (Chan et al. 2001) enhances both the 
amount of information available to police officers and the means to gain access 
to such data. 
A 2003 British Home Office study of police corruption in England and 
Wales (Miller 2003) found that the compromise of police information was 'the 
single most common type of corrupt activity' in UK policing (ibid.: 10, iii). It 
was suggested that 'the picture of corruption [in England and Wales] is domi-
nated by the leaking of information to those outside the organisation' (Miller 
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e;ruu'"""'Ju» are reluctant to 
to a law enforcement agency that has 
o>nt·nrr·»m culture that is of 
data is one that will fail to 
In a 2010 review of 'recurring themes' in the'"~"'"'"''"""'" 
investigations, the Victorian of Police Integrity noted how the ,,..,,..,,~~ihlu 
unforeseen and consequences' of information disclosure can strike at 
the very heart of the policing function: 
In addition to the privacy of individuals, the success of an 
operation or the integrity of an investigation or prosecution, other con-
sequences of unauthorised disclosures may be even more serious. There are 
two high profile cases since 2004 where publication of leaked uuvu,mu1vu 
i~mediately preceded the murder of key witnesses in police corrup-
tiOn cases. There are other instances where leaked infom1ation has also: 
put at risk the safety of operational police 
created opportunities for suspects to collude, flee or destroy evidence 
compelled a premature response by police requiring a covert 
to become overt 
re-traumatised victims 
caused witnesses to withdraw cooperation. 
(Office of Police Integrity 2012: 16; see also 
Office of Police integrity 20 lOb) 
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It also stated that many of our indicate a reckless dis-
regard for the consequences of a tew indicate a deliberate self-
interest or malicious motivation behind the leak' of Police 
2012: see also 2008). it was that pre-
valence of from within Victoria Police . . . indicates that Victoria 
Police has a cultural that manifests in 'a of 
standing behaviour leak confidential and sensitive 
infonnation' of Police Integrity 201 Ob: 9). 
Davids (2005, 2008) the problem of access and use of 
police infonnation as of a wider of conflict of interest, noting that the 
of information misuse extends mere curiosity or interestedness, 
with many cases involving active attempts to advance interests. Around 
many parts of the world, public awareness of the playing-out of conflicts of 
interest in public roles has contributed to a general decline in tntst in offi-
cials (Boyce and Davids 2009). Unauthorised access and disclosure of police 
infonnation presents an archetypal conflict of interest because it unambiguously 
involves the placement of private interests ahead of the public interest. It also 
generally breaches police infonnation access protocols and ipso facto may itself 
be classified as police misconduct or corruption as well as a possible pre-
cursor to more serious breaches of duty (Davids 2008). 
Unauthorised disclosure of infonnation from a police database is a criminal 
offence in some jurisdictions.4 In addition to statutory the behaviour 
may also be caught through a broad common law offence of 'misconduct in 
public office' or statutory codifications of the same offence.5 The majority of 
misconduct in public office offences prosecuted at common law appear to 
involve public officials (but not necessarily police officers) who make improper 
use of information (Crime and Misconduct Commission 2008: 29). For the 
police, however, such matters are more commonly dealt with through internal 
discipline systems and recourse to criminal prosecution and sanctions is unusual 
Integrity 2005b: 23).6 
trust 
Cultural problems that are manifested in an apparent nonnative acceptance of 
the misuse of police infonnation represent a particular challenge for developing 
appropriate systems of accountability. ln many respects, accountability is an 
elusive concept - 'one of those evocative political words that can be used to 
patch up a rambling argument, to evoke an image of trustworthiness, fidelity, 
and justice, or to hold critics at bay' (Bovens 2005: 182). Bovens notes that it 
therefore has rhetorical and iconic dimensions that evoke notions of 'good gov-
ernance'. 'Public' accountability relates both to the status of both account-giving 
and account-giver - relating to the public sector, where the account-giving is 
done in some public way, to (or on behalf of) the public, and relating to public 
managers, spending public money, exercising public authority and/or managing 
under public law. 
trust 91 
of 
to nurture proactive through the of rPQfil"'1nc•1"-
ility as a personal and subjective sense of rightness and good conscience ... 
[as well as] accountab[ility] for the exercise of ... power. 
operates through organisational structures and hierarchies, but public offic-
ers must also be accountable to the broader community. 
(Boyce and Davids 2010: 
The pervasive, persistent and recurring nature of problems unau-
thorised access to or use of police information suggests that 'progress, over the 
long term, has been unacceptably slow' (Commissioner for Law bntor·ceJne:nt 
Data Security 2012: 4). The more recent revelations from the Leveson 
suggest that both operational police and police management may have insuffi-
cient practical understanding of the nature and dimensions of the problem of 
inappropriate access to and use of infonnation, and of the accountability issues 
involved. These matters are examined in the remainder ofthe chapter. 
the nature 
Miller (2003) reported that abuse of the UK Police National Computer (PNC) 
database was said to be the subject of approximately 5 per cent of UK police 
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recorded 
ing around 2 per cent of all 
in Leveson 20l2a: 810). 
In Davids' Australian 
involved the misuse of 
fn 
conflict of interest cases 
HH'-'"""''"'-''''' with two-thirds of these 
cases disclosure of information to outside (see Davids 2008: 
disclosure of 153). Contemporary concerns in Australia 
police information are in reports from various mdlep1~nclent 
ag<:nc!es, which have identified the issue as a problem that often 
presents as a crucial dimension or common denominator in many flow-on issues 
for policing (e.g. Integrity 2005c: 23; Crime and Misconduct 
Commission 2011 ). In addition, a number of high-profile official investigations 
examining the circulation of highly protected Police or parts 
thereof to criminals and others underscores the need to protect colmcten-
tial police information (Director-Police Integrity 2005d). 
tim•mtltilioM and cmmnzu~;ltCtltitm tE~Citno;W,tJ-zes 
ICTs and official computer databases are increasingly important to In 
Australia, which has separate police jurisdictions in each state, each police force 
holds its own computerised database; however, as in the UK, there is a National 
Police Reference System, which can link information for Australia's state-based 
police agencies (known as 'CrimTrac' - www.crimtrac.gov.au) .. Databases 
provide police officers with online access to information to cnme reports 
and associated dealings between police and victims, offenders and members of 
the public. For example, the Victoria Police 'LEAP' (Law Enforcement Assist-
ance Program) computer database is: 
used to record crime incidents and personal particulars and captures a range 
of information including details of lost and stolen property and vehicles of 
interest to law enforcement. LEAP provides an online interface to internal 
and external systems to facilitate name, vehicle and place searches. It is also 
used in relation to fingerprint classifications, case management and intelli-
gence collation. Access to LEAP peaks at around 350,000 transactions daily 
and the system is lined to over 5,000 terminals 24 hours per day. The system 
is extensively used in support of operational policing and as a resource to 
provide management data. 
Information stored on LEAP is, in large part, sensitive and personal. 
(Director -Police Integrity 2005b: 9-1 0) 
The ease with which access can be gained often means that it is a relatively 
simple matter for a police officer or member of police staff to obtain information 
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in which he or she has no interest. use of ICTs has made the 
of ethical breaches easier because bureaucratic processes 
accessible to all those inside 
the of and monitor-
recent that at 
'""·nau,v·,••·a• fixes' have been less than successful. 
a source of evidence of database use, such evidence is 
not conclusive or definitive and is useful ex - as a 
source of evidence after misconduct has occurred. Reliance on access codes has 
notable for vA<UlHJ!IO, 
the access codes of "v''"""' ... '"" 
1992: 13, 
VSCA 205). 
are unable to recall 
book, which cannot be 'v"''""'u· 
There is a common to leave "'v'·'""'""' 
have been someone else who used their 
could have been using the and someone else them 
to a transaction on their behalf but they have no recollection as to 
who that person have been. 
Similarly, a Victorian Ombudsman's Report made the 
interviewed: 
justified their access by reference to some 
when 
- for to avoid forming a possible undesirable associ-
ation; to ascertain from car registration details seen in the vicinity of a per-
son's home if the member or his family were under possible surveillance or to 
ascertain whether there were outstanding warrants against a family member. 
(The Ombudsman 2001: 20) 
Evidence to the Leveson Inquiry from various UK Constabularies did not a 
clear picture of computer database misuse, however some important evidence 
emerged relating to Britain's PNC database. The PNC (established in 1974) links 
a number of separate databases and holds a range of records including the details 
of individuals who are convicted, cautioned, arrested, wanted or missing; the 
registered of vehicles; individuals with a driving licence entitlement or 
who are disqualified; certain types of stolen and recovered property including 
animals, firearms, trailers, plant machinery and engines; it supports enquiries 
against the national phone register and contains the details of individuals on the 
national Firearms Certificate Holders Register. The PNC is used by all UK 
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forces and other authorised those with a brief to 
examine serious crime. Evidence to the indicated that it has 
'in excess of250,000 users and handles in excess of 169 million transactions per 
annum, giving a average under transactions' all of which 
2012a: 812). 
to user activity and logging 
Agency Head of PNC Services, Karl 
It is given the transaction rate of the that it 
was claimed that the PNC was only 'misused for unlawful disclo-
sure, with the associated belief expressed that the current 
'effective and and that there was no 
problem, nor that any and additional 
be effective' (Wissgott, quoted in Leveson 2012a: 813). 
missioner of the Metropolitan Police Service confirmed that over 200 officers 
and support staff had been disciplined for unlawful PNC access in the 
ten years, with 106 of these matters relating to the last three years; it suggested 
additional safeguards were (Hogan-Howe, cited in Leveson 2012a: 
813). These figures and the trend represented therein provide an indica-
tion of the persistence of this problem - which is likely to be even more 
ficant given the likelihood of additional undetected and unknown breaches. 
There is some evidence to suggest that there is a tolerance for accessing data-
base information, which is often regarded as a relatively minor offence. This 
seems particularly the case if access is motivated by professional curiosity rather 
than malicious intent or nefarious motives and if the information is not passed 
on, or disclosed, to third (Davids 2005). 7 111e idea that police members 
are entitled to access information may be culturally ingrained within police 
forces (see Director-Police Integrity 2005b: 15). 
It is clear that the increasing use of technologically mediated systems has 
brought a new series of challenges for systems of accountability in terms of their 
effectiveness and reach. ln circumstances where information is ever more 
important to it is vital to recognise that '[i]nformation and 
integrity ... are the preconditions for effective information systems that empower 
police to do their jobs effectively and safely' (Commissioner for Law Enforce-
ment Data Security 2009: 7). The technological tightening of audit traits may 
assist in identifying system users and provide proof of access, but debate about 
the legitimacy of individual actions often centres on the justification offered for 
accessing information. This emphasises the importance of ensuring that the 
design and implementation of infonnation systems is intertwined with systems 
of accountability, such that all users of ICTs are cognisant of their responsibil-
ities and accountabilities for the use of official information. 
Other sources 
Whilst police databases provide a ready and convenient source of infom1ation, 
police officers may also make private use of information gleaned in the ordinary 
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the typical 
l119,tnnrorori<ltP USe Of databases for •ne•.r~t)n<l 
such as the conduct of checks on friends and or on motor vehicles 
that a police officer is purchasing. This type of abuse was said to be 
'a common feature of cases'. Davids (2008) Miller's cat-
to several other uses of 
commercial dealings; business and secondary 
friends or members in private commercial dealings; 
in private, non-commercial private 
relationships; and professional curiosity. 
Analysis of cases by Davids that many problems arise in the context of 
private business, commercial and employment dealings and arrangements, where 
. itself is often an important 'currency'. Police information may be 
obtamed from outlined, or the position of officer 
may be used to obtain information (in relation to a private matter) that would not 
be available to an ordinary citizen. 
The use of police information in such contexts may also be combined with 
"~.WHJW" behaviour towards those engaged in business with the officer. For 
a case where a officer obtained personal details (home 
licence details) of a debt collector with a major finance company, who had con-
tacted the officer in relation to monies owed on a vehicle (Case 69). In another 
case, a police officer used his position to obtain prior ownership and sale details 
of a motor vehicle he had in a private sale, then used this information 
in an attempt to have the sale (to him) nullified and have his money returned 
(Case 121). Yet another matter involved a dispute over the parts used in 
to a motor where an officer pretended to be conducting an official 
tigation in order to obtain information that would assist him in this 
(Case 64). 
Police may also to obtain a private benefit from the use of ;.,t,...,..,~ 
tion in the context of their own private business or . secondary employment 
arrangements. In this context, the use of police information may be associated 
with an intention to derive a financial benefit that would not otherwise 
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be to the 
interfere with a police officer's 
include: 
r".lllvi",•'Ul\JH-:> that a 
for such interests to 
enforcement of the law. Case f'.Y<•mr>~f'.c: 
onto the police dataoatse. ""''tr<n·v 
robbery in order to assist in 
business (Case 31 
lntem1ea use of information obtained in the course of 
in up a private business in 
services (Case 234); 
A police officer, whilst on his way to work an ostens-
ibly 'random' licence check of a he obtained database 
details about the driver and contacted the person in an effmi to recruit him 
into a work-from-home networking business (Case 236); and 
Secondary employment in the surveillance or private investigations industry 
and the use of official motor vehicle information in this context 
(Case 345).8 
The use of police information in the manner described above may also extend to 
attempts to assist family members or associates of in the context of their 
own private business and commercial dealings, such as debt collection matters 
or business/commercial disputes (Case 256) or tenancy disputes (Case 176). 
Police officers may also seek to a personal advantage in private, non-
commercial matters, including what would normally be regarded as relating to 
'family' and relationship matters. For example, the use of a police database to 
track an ex-spouse in relation to problems concerning maintenance payments or 
other family law disputes (Cases 120, 152, 375), including child custody dis-
putes (Case 360). There is also evidence that police officers may seek to use 
police information in the context of attempts to further intimate personal rela-
tionships, such as obtaining personal particulars of a person in whom the indi-
vidual officer may be 'interested' (Cases 113, 111, 19), or personal information 
about a former domestic partner (Case 223). Information use in some circum-
stances may be easily (mis)interpreted as constituting harassment or stalking 
(Case 268). The 'domestic' uses of police information extend to police officers 
accessing personal details of members of the public and other matters on the 
basis of an apparent or claimed 'professional curiosity'. Evidence suggests that 
police accountability systems tend to deal with such matters on an ad hoc or 
reactive basis. For instance, following a 2003 public scandal over several police 
officers' access to the police files of a candidate standing in a state government 
election, the then Chief Commissioner of Victoria Police announced that much 
tougher rules and protocols over access to police information would be insti-
tuted. Under this approach, 'professional curiosity' would not be an acceptable 
reason for accessing any file, even where there was no malicious intent.9 While 
this could be regarded as representing an appropriate response in relation to the 
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formal rules for infonnation use, such rule alone are insufficient to chal-
the cultural of domestic use 
In 2005 in Western 580 
tioned for sending emails 
died in the Great Desert. 
bodies were circulated, with some 
macabre events. Such was the 
convened a 'restorative event that involved relatives of the dead men 
being invited to a forum in which could tell 50 of the offic-
ers of the and they had 
thorised circulation of the images. 10 such a restorative 
be regarded as an response in the individual 
producing some individual of personal 
nature of such an approach is to be insufficient to 
tural change that is central to the acceptance of the broader ~~~'~G'.'l,~i,nu""" 
attend to a police position and accountability for ""''vu". 
The release of confidential police information to outside has been an offi-
cial concern for many years. As far back as 1993, the Victorian Ombuds-
man (Police Complaints) concern ove~ both the of this 
of complaint and the high substantiation rate (The Ombudsman 1993: 1 
disclosures identified by the Deputy Ombudsman included 
mischievous "leaks"' of several kinds of information: 
the names of people charged, criminal histories, police intelligence, 
photographs and vehicle registration details. The types of most 
commonly released have been criminal histories and registration details. 
The release has usually been to friends and relatives of the police involved 
and, more generally, to representatives of the media. 
(The Ombudsman 1993: 11) 
As noted by the Victorian Commissioner for Law Enforcement Data 
leaking of police information is particularly problematic on a number of fronts: 
As has been demonstrated in an international context, the actions of a 
individual who releases sensitive information without authorisation can 
have a disproportionately large effect on organisational security and 
trust and confidence in the institutions tasked with protecting coJmrrmntity 
safety and security. 
(Commissioner for Law Enforcement Data Security 2012: 4) 
Miller found that the 'leaking of information plays a central role' in the 'more 
common form' of 'individual corruption' in England and Wales, whereby 
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'members activities in isolation from "'v'·'"'"'l"-. .. """ 
iii). He outlined several of leaks of police information to outside 
'"low-level" leaks' to friends or such as out 
data checks for friends businesses, which was described as 'common'; 
leaks of information' in rela-
tion to that 'tended to 
involve n::r11mAm 
before the Leveson information 
to whether or through an !llti~mtea:tat) 
payment (Miller 2003: 13). Davids' (2008) ,.,.,..,,",.!{'·"' 
ficant categories ofleaks to outside parties: low-level leaks in the context of 
a business or commercial leaks in the context of criminal un'""'·'iS~•uvu", 
legal or associated and leaks to the media.12 
Low-level leaks 
Many low-level leaks may be conceptualised as an extension of the 'domestic' 
use of information, where the personal or interests or curiosity of 
the police officer is replaced or supplemented by the curiosity or interest of 
another party to whom information is disclosed. a officer may pass 
on police information in order to assist members or associates of police in 
the context of their own private business and commercial dealings, such as 
tenancy disputes 365), personal relationships (Case 237) and other family-
related matters (Case 242). 
Davids' analysis showed that the conflict of interest involved in low-level leaks 
is often evident on the facts, yet not acknowledged either by the police officers 
concerned or management both often see the problem as relatively innoc-
uous. As with the apparent acceptance of domestic use of information (above), a 
police culture that accepts or marginalises the importance of 'low-level' breaches 
does not recognise how even seemingly minor breaches in such matters may 
impinge on police integrity and damage public trust. One prosecuted case in Vic-
toria involved the disclosure by a serving police officer to a former police officer 
(friend) of a number of police manuals regarding the operation of speed detection 
devices the context was the friend was intending to contest impending charges of 
exceeding the speed limit.13 Although the defendant was acquitted because most of 
the material provided was also available on the Internet, questions about partiality 
and 'helping a mate' are problematic from a public accountability perspective. 
Accountability systems, and individual officers, must attend to both the action 
itself and 'political optics' (Davids and Boyce 2008). 
Leaks in the context 
At what might be regarded as the 'high end' of low-level leaks are leaks in the 
context of a business or commercial matter- 'high' because disclosure is motivated 
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vu•>.c"'"'"' or commercial and there may be par-
"ff .. ""''"vu of the Force and trust in the of 
"'~""·'"uvu, "'"""'u•;o; insurance 
il<UH"""-'H"· These external were found to be a 
as 'embraced' the trade and a 
COJtltnibuted to its development. 
Such cases of police "'"''•VI.lllU<mlln 
not just with the actions and activities of 
relationships and 
recognise the need to clearly from personal int:en~sts 
ations. Although problems with some kinds of personal 
associations with criminals or suspects, are well rec:ognis~ect 
with within systems (through 
registration or prohibition of interests), the more general that can flow 
from private relationships and must also be attended to 
2006). of the 'shades of grey' in professional integrity and opera-
tional decision-making must be accompanied by enhanced understanding of the 
form of 'active accountability' that requires development of a sense of 
and collective responsibility in complex ethical situations. 
Leaks in the conte'Ct 
matters 
or associated 
Leaking of police information to and others has been identified as a 
particular contemporary problem in Australia and the UK (Director-Police 
2005a; Miller 2003; Davids 2008: 228-32). In Victoria, there has been much 
concern surrounding leaks of sensitive police information to criminals. Some of 
these leaks have compromised major drug-trafficking investigations, prosecu-
tions and, in one instance, were believed to have resulted in the murders of a 
police informer and his wife (Director-Police Integrity 2005d; Taskforce Keel-
see Victoria Police 20 13). 
Leaks of police information of this nature are much more serious than low-
level leaks because of both the nature of the infonnation and the context within 
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which it may be which includes criminal matters or in 
civil or criminal This kind of conflict of interest may 
in the matters hinder 
nr"'""'nT them 
overall may be called into 
cases h..-rmont before the Victorian courts have included 
matters involving the disclosure database information to a 
friend and his a<>sociates an ongoing into the a::>~·v'-'.a'""' 
and the disclosure by a detective of confidential police information from various 
sources tcH.<:OIJ"' to a 
registered police informer and dealer. 15 
Other cases examined in Davids' study involved the supply of police evidence 
witness statements, criminal histories of individuals and other sensitive 
information. Most cases involved concerns about releases of information to 
offenders but it can be equally problematic for the administration of justice to 
provide information to an alleged victim in a criminal matter (Case 212). The 
context of such leaks included pending or possible criminal charges (Cases 76, 
15), civil proceedings (Cases 115), employment law issues (Case 160), and 
family law and other family or relationship matters (Cases 255, 86, 18, 149, 
In addition to concerns over conflict of interest, such matters could be regarded as 
attempts to pervert the course of justice and could on the viability of legal 
proceedings (Case 15). These cases also illustrate the potential for damage to be 
caused to individuals, which is present whether leaked information (e.g. about a 
criminal history) is accurate or not (e.g. about allegations or other unproven 
matters). This reiterates the importance of police officers being aware of their duty 
not to release confidential information, and the general injunction to not allow per-
sonal interests to interfere in official actions and decisions. Leaks of information 
may seem harmless from the perspective of the police officer involved, but the 
flow-on implications for public trust may be substantial. 
Even more serious are deliberate leaks to criminals, which may be done as a 
favour to illicit associates of a police officer or in return for payment (Miller 
2003: 13). Leaks to criminals may also be and may effectively result 
from what may be thought of as a low-levelleak, as found in Miller's study: 
Leaked information can find its way to criminals even where this is not 
deliberately intended. In some cases, it is passed to associates, such as relat-
ives, friends, social acquaintances or even colleagues, who, in 
tum, pass this information on to criminals. These types of arrangements 
apparently allow some criminals to network their way indirectly :into police 
circles to obtain police information ... some criminals [appear] to have a 
number of links of this kind with different members of police staff. 
(Miller 2003: 17) 
Recent revelations in Victoria indicate a large volume of police records (including 
LEAP database records and sensitive information relating to police informers) 
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between 
club members convicted of 
Leaks to the media 
The Leveson in the UK the notion 
drew attention to the role of the media in 
and out that public confidence in the is 
axiomatic in the model and noted the crucial role the media 
as a conduit for intelligence in relation to and crime. 
effective and and the media are 
for successful policing. can also media stories from 
scuppering investigations and in worse case scenarios ,v~v~·~wu.,_ 
the safety of victims or highly sensitive case ~-'"'"""u .. ,u;;;. 
In its submissions to the Leveson Inquiry, the Commissioner ofthe 
itan Police Service (MPS) five areas in which the media 
properly about policing and criminal matters was critical to the fimc~ 
of the police (Leveson 2012b: 7465): 
Police can communicate messages associated with and 
detecting crime; 
2 A healthy can public understanding of the work of 
policing; 
3 Police can seek the assistance of the public, via the media; 
4 Public confidence in the police may be enhanced, ,ge11er:atntg 
under·staindimz of police policies and initiatives; and 
5 The relationship provides a means whereby the public can scrutinise 
police actions and policies, and the police can 'test the persuasiveness 
of their strategies, and tactics'. 
(Hogan-Howe, cited in Leveson 2012b 746-7) 
The key concern outlined by Miller (2003) for the release of police 
to the media was that it often involves the making of payments to police officers 
for information provided to journalists. Concern was also expressed that the dis-
closure of sensitive operational police information could directly impact on 
police sources. It was also noted that there could be an association between leaks 
to the media and to 'Certainly, where is leaked to journal-
ists it is likely to end up in the public domain, which will inevitably include 
criminals' (Miller 2003: 14). 
102 c. and G. 
In 
leaked advance 
gestion that the officer 
""'"'"""'rl to have had a 'v''""-'""'"u.u'"" 
v""""·v"''" interests. In another Victorian matter that was 
the courts, the issue was not a release of information to the 
of very sensitive material in a book written by a 
detective. The relating to a high-profile investigation was ,."'"'""'''",.. 
by police as possibly leading to the of 
informers. 18 
Balanced against the general injunction against information to the 
media is the notion that the release of police information to parties the 
organisation, including to the may form an important public account-
ability function, sometimes known as 'whistle-blowing'. A 1990s case in Victo-
ria involved a prominent who made public 
comments about police operations, to a major internal 
investigation. These whistle-blower's comments were made to various media 
outlets, including mainstream and radical print media and radio (Case 318). An 
investigation of the underlying case by the State Ombudsman and Victoria 
Police internal investigations (1995-7) resulted in disciplinary charges against 
approximately 550 Victoria Police members (see The Ombudsman 2003: 72). 
The whistle-blower himself faced proceedings for allegedly failing 
to comply with a lawful instruction from the Commissioner to cease 
making public comments; it was argued that public comment could compromise 
a specific police 
Taking a different perspective, Sandra Laville, Crime Correspondent for the 
Guardian newspaper, identified to the Leveson Inquiry (2012b: 747) how journ-
alism plays an important role in maintaining the media as the "eyes 
and ears" ' in relation to the coercive powers afforded to the On this 
basis, a proper public interest and democratic function of the media is to chal-
lenge, interrogate and question police actions. The Inquiry noted the possibility 
of tension in the relationship between media and police, pointing to the differing 
needs of each party in relation to high-profile investigations (Leveson 2012b: 
748-50). It is broadly recognised that: 
[b]oth police and the media have an important role in serving the public 
interest. ... Media attention can assist police to solve crimes and convey 
important messages about emergency evacuations in natural disasters, road 
safety or alcohol-related violence. The media is also used to hold police 
accountable to the public they serve. 
(Office of Police Integrity 2012: 25) 
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i'"'""''i"'''t''"' before it is finalised ,..,.,..,....,...,.,...m 
lVeStl~?;atl.on. When details of offences are aired there is a real risk 
other evidence gathering processes will be tainted. For leaked details 
can a witness to an account that is influenced what he 
she has read or heard in the rather than details from the per~ 
son's own knowledge. if one version of an incident under 
is publicly opinion about the case can be deter-
mined without access to a full set of accurate data. This can 
expectations that police will act in a way, for example 
person. This places pressure on police to meet those ex:pe(:tatioras. 
of Police 2012: 
The public impact of ethical breaches relating to disclosure and/or use of 
infonnation is high. The failure of honesty and on the of indi-
vidual public officials can have a particularly damaging effect on 
the integrity and impartiality of police. When is not 
and confidence in the whole police organisation is affected. In public trust 
relates to the extent to which individuals expect others to be constrained by the 
duties and requirements attached to their roles, and to act to prevent abuses of 
official positions. It relies on a belief in the integrity of both individual 
officers and police organisations as a whole. In addition to comprom-
ising investigations, unauthorised disclosure may negatively impact many prac-
tical aspects of policing. For instance, it may lead to reluctance on the of 
those who supply infonnation to police to do so in the future, which may under-
mine the continued supply of information essential to the policing function (see 
Billingsley et al. 2001). 
In terms of conflict of the leaking or use of official information for 
non-official purposes involves private interests (including the interests of 
family, friends and associates of a police officer) prevailing over public ethics 
and public duty. Notions of friendship and mateship, which may motivate 
are equally misguided in situations where a police officer is asked by a 
relative, acquaintance, former colleague or private inquiry agent to make unof-
ficial inquiries on their behalf. Even though low-level leaks may be as 
minor, police officers can be caught in a conflict between loyalty to family or 
friends and their obligation to keep confidential those matters coming to their 
attention as a police member. It may also be that 'officers do not appreciate the 
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seriousness of disclosure at any time' Effective 
narmgernem lies in the responses that police make to these and in rec-
that this area a that officers may rea.sormoiV 
to have to confront. 
Earlier in the 
rin,inidr,,t;,lp, dimensions 
ethical sense that relates to the demonstration of 
Bovens (2005, 2010) several key functions of public 
democratic control within institutional which may be 
""'c'"''"'i"'rl as including hierarchical within organisations and 
agencies, ultimately proceeding up to ministerial and levels; 
2 enhancement of the integrity of public governance by and detect-
ing corruption, nepotism, abuse of power and other forms of una~th~rised 
and inappropriate behaviour, particularly in the context of the applicatiOn of 
delegated powers; 
3 maintaining and enhancing the legitimacy of public governance - a par-
ticular challenge in light of a general decline in confidence in public 
institutions and an absence of automatic deference to public authority; 
4 ritual and purifying functions that may provide some form of public cathar~ 
sis in response to tragedies, fiascos, scandals and failures; 
5 fostering individual and organisational learning in ways that discourage or 
prevent future misconduct and enhance future performance often .thr?ugh 
the development and reinforcement of appropriate norms and organtsatwnal 
culture that induce reflexivity and openness. 
Dealing with the multiple challenges of accountability that are reflected in these 
functions implicates 'a whole series of flows, circuits, connections, disconnec-
tions, selections, favourings, accounts, holding to account and attempts at ana-
lysis' that means accountability in action involves a certain degree of 'messiness' 
(Neyland and Woolgar 2002: 272). As Bovens (2005) comments, '[p]ublic 
accountability may be the complement of public management it certainly is the 
predicament of public managers' (Bovens 2005: 202). 
The traditional concept of accountability in the public sector involves answer-
ability to the community for, and exercise of, legal power and authority by a 
public official. The broader concept of social accountability invoked in this 
chapter takes a bottom-up social, rather than a top-down organi~ation~l, per-
spective in order to address ethical, organisational and cultural dnnenswns of 
organisational management. Thus, it also encapsulates both an: 
ex post answering for past decisions and actions and the need to have mech-
anisms in place that seek to deal with neglects of duty before they happen 
some level of attention to 
look' to reasonable members of the 
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in term.s of 'how 
nA1~Ql'0~ of confi-
TPI''lH.fnlT11Hn here that social 
seen to the reference for the mess and flows of connections' 
(Neyland and 2002: 272). 
Formal mechanisms of embodied in 
procedures and the like are vital to the first four functions 
outlined above and are instrumental to good governance. Just as •mno1rrmw 
vital to the development of accountable cultures that 
vv••«n'v" of accountability of "'"''vu•nuv• 
individual and organisational virtue 
that reflects a commitment to mt.,cn·•n; 
Accountability as a mechanism and accountability as virtue are corn-
and mutually reinforcing, but must be and 
addressed 2010). The social accountability framework for sector 
conflict of interest developed by and Davids (2009, 2010) tackles the 
three core dimensions of the problem via three key elements of social account-
ability, with a 'reasonable person' standard (see 5.1). 
lt is possible for an accountability system to deal with unauthorised use of confi-
dential police information as an of the broader problem of conflict of interest. 
Thus, problematic interests are attended to by limiting or prohibiting certain 
interests that are inherently problematic. Such interests may be defined for this 
purpose as identifiable types of private interest that are deemed to be ""~>'""''""Y 
problematic, and therefore unacceptable, due to inherent incompatibility with 
ro!es. The analysis in this chapter suggests that this is likely to include interests such 
as associations with criminals, commercial or off-the-record relations with 
ists, and identifiably problematic forms of outside or secondary employment or 
business arrangements (including in the private inquiry industry). 
Nevertheless, it is recognised that not all potentially conflicting interests can 
be effectively or reasonably regulated, such as those associated with familial and 
friendship relationships. These interests are recognised as giving rise to ""V"'""'"'" 
conflicts in certain circumstances only, and may be dealt with through the struc-
turing of roles and functions so that officers are not involved in matters that may 
give rise to a conflict of interest. This requires both awareness of the nntAnt•" 
problems and a preparedness to manage them in a situation-specific manner. 
These two elements dealing with problematic interests and potential and actual 
conflicts - are buttressed and 1mderpinned by ethical accountable organisa-
tional cultures. Finally, appearances, or public perceptions, are an essential 
consideration in dealing with conflict of interest issues. The key aspect of 
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Prophylaxis: 
limitations on 
problematic 
private interests 
Misuse of information 
Social accountability framework 
Element2: 
Dealing with 
manifestations ol 
conflict; 
structure and 
management of 
work duties 
Element3: 
Elements i and 2 underpinned by 
ethical and 
accountable cultures 
'Reasonable 
person' standard; 
maintaining public 
perceptions and 
confidence 
Figure 5.1 Social accountability framework for police integrity in the context of private 
interests (source: adapted from Boyce and Davids 2009, 2010). 
conflict of interest that undermines public trust and confidence in police relates 
to perceptions that a public position has been used for private advantage, chal-
lenging the ostensible commitment to serve the public rather than private 
interest. This is therefore destabilising for the policing function itself. 
Understanding, and responding to conflicts of interest generated by 
unauthorised and inappropriate use of confidential information requires con-
sideration of the intersection of subjective and objective elements. The sub-
jective element relates to whether an individual has actually sought to gain a 
private advantage for themselves or others from the inappropriate use of a public 
position. The objective element revolves around application of a 'reasonable 
person' test that considers how things, in a particular circumstance, would 
appear to a reasonable member of the public. Because subjective concerns 
cannot be determined without 'knowing' the mind of the individual, effective 
management of conflicts of interest focuses on the objective element, which pro-
vides the standard or test against which judgements about conflict of interest 
may be made. This involves considering how things would look to a reasonable 
observer. Judgements about the appropriateness of particular classes of interests, 
and about the structuring of work duties to deal with conflicts, may also be made 
with reference to this standard. 
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framework seeks to nurture account-
of as both a shared and 
co1nnmriltv is 
that must consider both facts 
are central to effective nol1c1nP". 
and without it the 
macy and hence cannot function ,n;,.,-.t'""h' 
2010:3 
Conclusion 
Changing the culture of has proven to be it 
a two attack - an education program to drive home an 
md.ers.tarldH1g of the risks and consequences of an unauthorised disclosure 
of information, with a highly visible sanctions program which will 
demonstrate that such disclosures will not be tolerated. 
(Office of Police 2012: 17) 
The issue of'leaks' of police information demonstrates how the power and 
tion of police officers may be used to obtain infonnation that is not for 
official purposes, but which may be used to further the private interests of the 
police officer and associates. The conflict with official police duties is clear and 
unambiguous. When such matters come to light, they have the potential to 
severely damage the reputation of a police and to diminish the 
and propensity of members of the public to trust police officers who on them 
to support the policing function. Although a range of harms can result, in worst 
case scenarios can jeopardise investigations and lead to the injury or death 
of witnesses and informers. Failure to respect the trust that is placed in police to 
protect confidential information is also likely to have serious consequences for 
operational policing and for the reputation of a police force and the public trust 
that is placed in it. 
Effectively dealing with the issues canvassed in this chapter requires some 
reflection on the nature and purposes of the public sector and of policing within 
the public realm. A clear 'commitment to integrity and ethics in the pursuit of 
the public interest is a bedrock of a socially accountable approach' (Boyce and 
Davids 2009: 633), but effective accountability requires both the assurance pro-
vided by mechanisms and a commitment to embrace an active sense of 
responsibility and adherence to public values by individuals, managers and their 
organisations. 
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6 ? ® 
The election across and Wales on 15 November 2012 of 41 Police and 
Crime Commissioners (PCCs) marked the launch of a novel governance model 
for crime prevention and at the local level. lt was, 
however, a particularly inauspicious start. An low turnout at the 
polls- among the lowest in British electoral history, with an average of just 14.7 
per cent only seemed to fuel the wave of scepticism that had the 
debate on the Government's proposals and which had also been 
rife within professional policing and criminal justice including the 
authorities that the elected PCCs were to replace 2013). 
such an show of enthusiasm and democratic 
for PCCs in the elections seemed to have amplified media interest in the 
new modeL In the ensuing months, a spate of media provided several of 
the new commissioners with much albeit mostly ""'"'""""' 
uuua11 v at least, much of this focused on allegations of cronyism in the ""'""'f'\'71'+-
ment of deputies and assistants to PCCs, and also on the 
costs to the public purse of the new teams that the commissioners were establish-
In the West Midlands, for example, the PCC chose to make senior 
appointments a Deputy Commissioner, three Assistant Commissioners and 
four Non-Executive Members- to form a Strategic Policing and Crime Board 
that appeared, to the critics at least, to recreate the former police authority in a 
new guise. Meanwhile, the Lincolnshire PCC made the national media headlines 
when his decision to suspend his acting chief constable for alleged misconduct 
ended up in the High Court with the quashing of the suspension (the 
subsequently being withdrawn) and a bill for legal fees amounting to some 
£58,000 (Guardian 2013a). Similarly profiled was the saga of 17-year-old Paris 
appointed as Youth Commissioner to assist the Kent PCC, but then 
resigning just a few days later in response to revelations about inappropriate 
'tweets' she had posted two years earlier (BBC News 9 April 2013). There was 
also wide reporting of the conflict between the Gwent PCC and his chief con-
stable, Carmel Napier, who, it was reported, had been pressurised into 
(Guardian 20 13b ). 
Such reports may have made uncomfortable reading for the Home Secretary, 
since the proposals for the new governance model had so recently and narrowly 
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